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Islamic State E-Caliphate on Twitter: An Observational Study

 دراسة مراقبة:الخالفة اإللكترونية للدولة اإلسالمية على تويتر

Dr. Sultan Al-masaeed
Al-Ahliyya Amman University

s.masaeed@ammanu.edu.jo

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) media strategy is a successful one. It has enabled a small group of social
media users to amplify impressions of the organization far beyond its actual effect, capturing global attention. This
terrorist group has proven quite effective in using Twitter to spread their evil ideas, recruit followers and post obscene
videos depicting the most egregious cruelty imaginable. In this exploratory research, an observational research was
undertaken to explore the strategies and tactics deployed by the group in their use of Twitter. The results show that
ISIS has successfully utilized this social media platform as a tool to achieve its goals and implement its media strategy.

Keywords: ISIS Twitter, Islamic state media, ISIS social media, Islamic E-Caliphate, counterterrorism
intelligence.
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Background
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is one of the
plethora of terrorist groups and paramilitary organizations that emerged from instability in Iraq. Its operations permeated the Syrian border (particularly after
2011) and achieved particular notoriety after the rout
of the Iraqi army in Mosul in June 2014nseized a great
volume of military hardware that greatly enhanced its
military capabilities and potential political legitimacy.
This is particularly important given the immense historical and geostrategic importance of Mosul Province (Stanton et al., 2015). Consequently it was emboldened to announce the restoration of the Islamic
Caliphate three weeks later, under the leadership of
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In addition to its logistical differentiation from conventional terrorist groups and
sectarian militias, ISIS presents a qualitative evolution
of the al-Qaeda model with a more professional strategy, which incorporates a practical model for social
governance (Lister, 2014).
Al-Qaeda style groups and terrorist organizations in
general have been universally denounced from the
outset by Islamic clerics and mainstream religious es-

tablishments as a criminal aberration, such as in the
Amman Message of 2006, and the more recent specific and comprehensive refutation of ISIS issued by
the respected Sheikh Mohammad Al-Yaqoubi (2015),
an opponent of the Syrian regime as well as terrorist groups. Nevertheless, the declaration by ISIS of an
“Islamic State” as a tangible geopolitical phenomenon
with the potential to dramatically transform the geopolitical setting of the Middle East appeared to give
hope of redressing the grievances of many discontented people arising from political oppression, neocolonialism and poor socio-economic development,
which apparently overrode conventional norms and
inspired an influx of young jihadists from around the
world (Jabareen, 2015; Wood, 2015).
ISIS use of social media
Terrorist groups have used various means of media
through history, and recently they have focused
on the internet and social media tools (Crilley,
2001; Jacopson, 2010; Ogun, 2012; Lister, 2014;
Shane and Hubbard, 2014; Chatfield, Reddick and
Brajawidagna, 2015). Social media has become a
vital part of modern news and conflict, making it the
informational weapon of choice for terrorist groups,
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especially ISIS (Nissen, 2015). ISIS has succeeded in
establishing territorial authority due to its successful
recruitment of personnel by media propagation and
its brute terror to consolidate control (Cronin, 2016).
ISIS declared a Caliphate in the areas under its control
across Iraq and Syria in 2014, seizing the advantage
of domestic civil and sectarian cleavages in the Arab
World since 2011, with polarizing regional stressors.
ISIS is able to translate military victories into political
success through an extensive and pro-active social
media campaign, which has been widely recognized
as superior among professional organizations (Lewis,
2014). Its use of Twitter has been particularly effective
in disseminating its evil ideas, recruiting followers
and posting outrageous content such as videos of
decapitations and amputations by which it seeks to
demonstrate its authority (Stern and Berger, 2015).
ISIS members use social media both to communicate
with one another and to recruit new supporters and
members. Consequently the Department of Homeland
Security in the US has expanded its inspection of
social-media posts as part of its visa application
process, and it is actively considering additional ways
to incorporate the use of social media review in other
programs (Paletta and Hughes, 2015). ISIS has an
extremely large and powerful social media campaign
and presence on Twitter that consists primarily of a
few hundred effective accounts and thousands more
accounts tweeting only a few times before being
suspended for violation of the terms of use. The ISIS
media strategy is considered a success because of
this efficiency, whereby a small group of social media
users can exploit the slow responsiveness of social
media sites to effectively disseminate information
that amplify impressions of the organization far
beyond its actual effect (Berger and Morgan, 2015). It
is able to do this by the astute use of hashtags (Lister,
2014; Milmo, 2014). Finally, the reach of social media
and the Internet enables ISIS to mobilize supporters
from all over the world, and to continu¬ously refill its
ranks with fresh volunteers (Eisenstadt, 2014).
Research justification and contribution
While some Western studies have recently analyzed
the use of social media by ISIS (Berger and Morgan,

2015; Berger and Perez, 2016), very few studies have
analyzed their Arabic accounts. Although the majority
of Arabs and Muslims view the group as a terrorist
death cult, ISIS itself attempts to justify itself on
religious grounds, entailing a contextual analysis of
its tactics (Wood, 2015). As noted by McCants (2015),
ISIS is careful to presents its vision (i.e. propaganda)
in Arabic, written in classical language and drawing
on traditional concepts in an attempt to legitimize
its otherwise untenable ideology. Accordingly,
understanding its beliefs and tactics requires a
guide proficient in Islamic theology and Arabic
language, to counteract its chief ideologues who
are mainly Arabs (Saltman and Winter, 2014). They
speak in codes and allusions whose meanings may
be lost for those unfamiliar with specific traditions
and texts of traditional Islam. As a consequence, it
is very important for Arabic-speaking researchers to
observe their Arabic effective accounts and analyze
their tweets in order to understand their theology
and strategies. Therefore, this research can contribute
to international efforts aiming to fight this terrorist
group.

Methodology
Epistemology
This research utilized the qualitative approach of
online participant observation, a new ethnographic
method suitable for online studies called 'netnography' (Kozinets, 2015). Thirty effective Twitter accounts
belonging to ISIS supporters were selected and followed in order to uncover ISIS supporters’ tactics of
using Twitter. Traditional ethnography suffers barriers
in accessing social settings relevant to the research
problem (Bryman, 2008; Hesse-Biber, Nagy and Leavy,
2010), but netnography typically circumvents this as
anyone can follow any account on Twitter without the
permission of the account owner.
The researcher assumed a covert role, not disclosing
the fact that he is a researcher (Browne, 2005; Bryman,
2008). The researcher’s role is based on Gold’s (1958)
classification of participant observer roles, namely
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the “complete observer” who does not interact
with subjects. Qualitative research usually applies “a
general approach of beginning with general research
questions” (Bryman, 2008, p. 417); this research
began with the general research question of What are
ISIS tactics in using Twitter and why do they use it?

proaches used for qualitative data analysis (Bryman,
2008). Based on the thematic analysis, all tweets
collected were coded in order to identify repeated
themes. Furthermore, the researcher’s daily notes,
written down after noting something interesting,
were taken into account when extracting results.

Design

Results

Thirty ISIS supporters’ accounts each having more Through observing ISIS Twitter accounts and thematic
than 2000 followers were selected. This research was analysis, the researcher managed to define the followundertaken over a period of one month (June 1st ing:
to July 1st, 2015). Captured tweets were analyzed
through thematic analysis and daily notes were made.
A. How ISIS can keep their effective accounts

Figure (1): Research design

The research design is illustrated in figure (1).
Sample

active regardless of the international efforts
to suspend them.

Purposive sampling, which “can provide reliable and
robust data” (Tongco, 2007, p 154), was used in this
research to identify the subjects: 30 ISIS-supporting
accounts with more than 2000 followers in each Twitter. Sample characteristics were defined as being ISIS
supporters with more than 2000 followers.

B. Their security policy when using social media.

Data analysis
Captured tweets were analyzed using thematic analysis approach, which is one of the most common ap-

C.The main uses of Twitter by ISIS.
A. Keeping effective accounts active methodology
ISIS uses a unique method of keeping their key accounts active which explains why it is very difficult for
Twitter and security enforcement agencies to suspend
these accounts. The method consists of the steps ex-

33

account.

plained below and shown in figures (2) and (3):
•

Opening a new account similar to the
current account name through leaving
the same letters and changing numbers
in a sequential way.

•

Account owners announce the new
backup account and ask followers to follow this account without tweeting from
the backup account.

•

When the original account is suspended,
the account owner starts using the backup account.

•

The backup account owner follows other
major ISIS accounts, whose accounts
owners follow the backup account and
ask their followers to support the new

•

The backup account becomes main account and the process starts again.

Figure (2): Keeping effective accounts active methodology
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Figure (3): Back-up accounts using the same letters and changing numbers in a sequential way

B. ISIS security policy when using social media
ISIS effective accounts keep asking their supporters to
be cautious and to do the following:
•
Not to trust anyone on the Internet,
especially as some intelligence agencies
open Twitter accounts pretending that
they are ISIS supporters to try to spread
rumors.
•
Not to give any location-identifying
information for anyone.
•
Not to activate GPS in mobiles.
•
Preparing backup accounts to be ready
when primary accounts get suspended.
C. Main uses of Twitter by ISIS
Through thematic analysis, it was obvious that the
terrorist organization uses Twitter mainly to achieve
the following objectives.
1.
Wage their ideological battle ISIS
draws strength from the climate that
fomented its emergence, namely the
complex circumstances causing the

2.

failure of the states of Iraq and Syria,
including domestic civil and sectarian
cleavages, authoritarian leadership
and polarizing regional stressors. ISIS
uses Twitter to spread its propaganda,
explain its objectives, ideas and news,
succeed in convincing many naïve
Sunni Muslims that justice can only be
achieved by supporting ISIS (particularly
in Iraq, where Iranian hegemony made
the Iraqi state a tool of Shia sectarianism
seeking revenge from Arab Sunnis after
2003). Governments are held to be
oppressive apostates, while other Sunni
paramilitary/terrorist organizations are
presented as effete hypocrites.
Force multiplication ISIS is trying to
multiply its force through the use of
social media in order to present itself
as more powerful than it may actually
be by the aggressive dissemination of
online content, especially when they
face defeat on the ground to put a
positive spin on events. This serves two
purposes: gaining mass-media attention
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Figure (4): Advertising a campaign against Hamas entitled “Hamas is capturing Salafis”

I

3.

and getting more followers.
Existence of a tangible state and
establishing legitimacy ISIS tries to
ensure that its religious justification is
robust and to establish its legitimacy
over other jihadi groups. It uses Twitter
to attack its religious competitors such as
al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra and the Muslim
Brotherhood (including Hamas). Figure
(4) shows an advertising a campaign in
Twitter against Hamas under the title of
“Hamas is capturing [i.e. imprisoning]
Salafis,” referring to the followers of the
Salafist Islamic movement with which
ISIS identifies (Reese, 2012).
Salafism is an ultra-Orthodox refinement of
the Hanbalite reformist movement launched
by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, known
as Wahhabism in the West, which has been
the official school of the Saudi state since the
18th century. Reflecting its long history of
providing religious legitimacy for successive
Saudi regimes, Salafism heavily emphasizes
Islamic doctrines affirming obedience and

loyalty to the government. While senior
Salafist scholars disagreed with the Saudi
support for the Gulf War in 1990 they never
ceased to urge obedience. (It should be noted
that Salafist scholars have been the most
persistent critics of terrorism and terrorist
actions, particularly suicide bombing when
it emerged in the Palestinian resistance of
the 1990s.) Consequently, they are generally
viewed as regime stooges (‘scholars for
dollars’) by more militant Salafists such as alQaeda and their successors, as well as some
more mainstream Muslim organizations such
as the Muslim Brotherhood.
The disconnect between the denunciation
of terrorism by every reputed Islamic scholar
and the victims of ISIS recruitment being seduced by their ideology lies in the perception that the official institutions of Islam have
been coopted by the oppressive neocolonial
regimes who are the primary target of alQaeda style groups, making any attempt at
de-radicalization based on state control of
religion counter-productive (On Contact: The
Perversion of Islam with Hamza Yusuf, 2016).
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4.

5.

Conversely, ISIS draws on the long tradition
of obedience to the “Islamic state” historically
promulgated by scholars in the Arab World
to justify obedience to itself, purporting to
provide the accoutrements of a genuine state
to its “citizens”, such as education, health and
economic services.
Enlisting new members ISIS primarily
uses Twitter to promote its ideologies,
part of which is information warfare
whereby it seeks to promote its successes on the battlefield while denouncing
the atrocities of its enemies to gain sympathy. They particularly enjoy showing
the supposed benefits of suicide bombings, such as showing images of dead
bombers smiling as if they see paradise.
Based on subsequent reactions and
comments, ISIS begins to identify people who are sympathetic with them and
exchange direct messages with them as
the first stage of recruitment, trying to
convince them to join the group, commit
a terrorist act or provide other assistance
to terrorist activities in their own countries, which is the way ISIS becomes
complicit in lone wolf attacks in Western countries. Lone wolf attacks diverge
from traditional political violence in their
intersection with personal psychoses;
that is mentally disturbed and socially
alienated individuals who find expression for their manias in Internet ideologies such as Islamism or neo-Nazism that
seduce isolated individuals with terrorist tendencies and can ultimately guide
them to commit terroristic acts (Simon,
2013). The process by which ISIS enlists
new members is displayed in figure (5).
Strategic use of fear In this tactic, the
group creates a pervasive climate of fear
as a force multiplier (Vinci, 2005). The
basic tactic of ISIS is to make a surprise
attack, inflict maximum casualties,
spread fear, and then withdraws without

Figure (5): Recruitment process

suffering heavy losses. Members of ISIS
then broadcast their brutal acts such
as beheading and burning people
alive, and wait for their opponents and
unsympathetic locals to evacuate or flee
from the previously attacked territory.
This harrying strategy explains the use
of gratuitous violence by the group
and their dissemination of horrific
photos and videos as part of a shockand-awe campaign that derives the
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Figure (6): “An important lesson for the
supporters to learn and implement: [kidnapping and assassination]”
I

Figure (7): Checking hyperlinks for viruses

I

maximum emotive value from military
resources deployment. Therefore, their
use of violence is not random but
strategic, aiming to literally terrorize the
inhabitants of certain areas they wish to
control to flee, leaving only willing or
coerced supporters. This strategy makes
the holding phase easier to realize. It can
be concluded that this strategic use of
fear was used for propaganda purposes
in addition for controlling the territory
captured.
6.
Provide training materials to their
supporters The jihadists’ tech skills
are undeniable. Nearly every day their
effective accounts Tweet posts offering
tutorials on encryption, phishing and
securing messaging. They use Twitter
to provide information security training
to their supporters, in addition to other
training materials such as a lessons on
hijacking and assassination, as shown
in figure (6), which provides a link to
the justpaste.it website billed as an
important lesson for supporters to
learn and implement: kidnapping and
assassination. Another example shown
in figure (7) provides a hyperlink to the
dump.to website for checking hyperlinks
for viruses.
7.
Wage electronic battles Members
of ISIS wage what they call electronic
battles from time to time, following
certain steps. First, they determine the
exact time and the electronic content
they need to distribute. After that, they
define the targeted hash tags, which
are usually active hash tags that belong
to the targeted country or audience, as
illustrated in figure (8), which is a tweet
that defines an ISIS report about services
provided in Palmyra city as the intended
electronic content, and also it defines
some active hash tags, mainly in Saudi
Arabia.
Taking the previous results into account, it’s clear
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Figure (8): How to wage electronic battles

that the method of waging electronic battles for ISIS
has three fundamental stages, as illustrated below in
figure (9).

Figure (9): ISIS method of waging electronic battles
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Summary and recommendations
ISIS so far has succeeded in their media strategy. The
terrorist group has proven quite effective in using
Twitter to achieve some strategic goals, such as enlisting new members, spreading their ideology, providing training materials to their supporters and more
importantly using fear strategically for propaganda
purposes in addition to capturing and controlling
new territories. The terrorist group has a clear methodology in keeping its major accounts active and in
keeping a security policy. . Furthermore, the terrorist
group uses hash tag marketing effectively.
ISIS is also trying to prove the existence of a state in
the captured territories that provide all required services to citizens, such as education, health and economic welfare services. ISIS wants to prove that it has
a strong infrastructure and many services for families
who are willing to migrate to its “Caliphate”.
ISIS is trying hard to ensure that its religious legitimacy is robust; therefore counter-messaging efforts
should focus on theological challenges and on exposing the inherent brutality of the group. Based on the
above, this research recommends the following techniques and actions to combat ISIS in social media:
•
It is essential for mainstream religious
preaching and propagation to be transferred from the mosque to social media,
which is the true battleground of their
ideological war.
•
It is very important for moderate Islamic
countries to get into direct ideological
arguments with ISIS supporters on Twitter, with the establishment of a special
unit to generate and disseminate counter-messages.
•
It is very important for Muslim families to
be aware of their responsibilities towards
their children by safeguarding them
against ISIS and its dangerous activities
and ideologies.
•
There should be an international entity
to organize electronic content on the
internet and oversee issues related to
international legislation.
Counter-messaging efforts should focus

Conclusion
on the main weaknesses of ISIS, which are its spurious
religious justification and egregious carnage.
Research limitations and further research
The major limitation of this study was that Twitter
suspended many accounts during the observation
period; while this is to be welcomed, it prevents obtaining complete data for the purposes of this study.
Future research should focus on testing the efficiency
of counter-messaging. Researchers can observe different counter-messaging accounts for different countries and analyze and compare their efforts in combating ISIS ideologically. Future research may develop
a suggested counter-messaging framework as guidance for combating ISIS and other terrorist organizations through social media.
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